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BAR BRIEFS
deprived of due process of law. .

.

. It is the man without means to

pay the court costs, reporters' fees, costs of appeal and other charges
as a condition to enjoying the right to litigate and who, with his dependents, may not endure the delay of justice, that is heard to complain that the law is for only the rich and there is no justice and while
every man is entitled to the equal protection of the law, only he who
can pay for it and wait gets the law's protection. In this state of
mind, such a man whose rights have been infringed is an enemy to
society, a potential red. .

.

. It suggests that our administration of

justice often fails to secure actual justice in the case of the plain everyday citizen, who of necessity fits so generally into the social structure.
This is not because we have too few courts or too few judges or because the judges fail to work diligently and faithfully and honestly.
On the contrary, we may be reasonably sure that when a case actually
gets before a judge, justice will be done. Innumerable cases which are
meritorious and of far reaching consequence from a social standpoint
never reach a court because the persons who need judicial aid find
themselves unable to get their cases into court. There are three factors which impede the effective course of justice, when its protection
is sought by a person of small means. The first factor is delay. The
second is the expense in court costs, fees, reporters' fees and transcript
charges. The third factor is the necessity and expense of employing
lawyers, with no effective provision in law for the recovery of this
additional cost from the employer. Some states have imposed an
attorney's fee for the plaintiff where there is a suit on a wage claim,
but these statutes are not effective to overcome the objection of the
costs and fees to be advanced when suit is started or the seriousness
of delay."-D. A. Skeen of Salt Lake City Bar.
For some time the writer (Mr. Campbell) has felt that the matters brought to mind by these quotations were of importance and the
problems were problems requiring solution on the part of society, and
its corps of social workers, lawyers, judges, courts, legislatures and
others. The writer feels that these conditions can and should be
remedied; not thru one, but thru some or all of the following methods:
Legislation, Rules of Court, Small Claims Courts, Conciliation Tribunals, Legal Aid Societies, and Public Defenders. If anything is to
be accomplished along these lines, particularly in so far as legislative
action is required, the work should be started at this time and the
writer would be glad to hear from all persons interested, social workers, lawyers, judges and others, with an outline of their views on these
matters and suggestions of methods of organization and operation.
EXONERATION
The Supreme Court of North Dakota, following investigation and
report by the State Bar Board, recently exonerated Attorney F. E.
McCurdy of Bismarck, the charge against him being unprofessional
conduct, made by a prominent business man of that city.
Mention of the fact of such exoneration is made here, not because
of the particular individuals involved, nor because it is so unusual to
have'an attorney exonerated, but because the whole incident again
emphasizes the inadequacy of such exonerations, even if they should
be followed; later, by recovery of money damages.
More so than men engaged in other callings or professions, practicing attorneys seem to be at the mercy of an apparently merciless

BAR BRIEFS
public; yet, if that public's charges are found to be unfounded, by what
measure may we adequately measure the harm that may have been
done? Particularly disquieting is this question if the charges happen
to relate to the honesty or integrity of the attorney, and happen to be
made deliberately, and by a person of more than ordinary standing
and influence.
We, of course, have set up standards, and we talk about compensatory and punitive damages. But they are mere approximations,
guesses; occasionally, they mean nothing to the man against whom they
.are assessed. Exoneration! Damages! Neither nor both can ever
adequately gauge the effect of the charges upon the public, much less
the effect upon the individual to whom the charges relate.
In one case the incident might be forgotten by the public the next
day, while the individual affected might brood over it until be became
a nervous wreck. Again, the wronged individual might be temperamentally and philosophically capable of dismissing the matter immediately, yet the doubt created by the mere statement of the charge might
never be erased from the minds of many constituting his public, and
.that, notwithstanding exoneration or a successful suit for damages.
One wonders sometimes if the public is not becoming just a little
bit shocked at some of its own ruthlessness.
REVIEW OF NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
Chrysler Light & Power Co. vs. City of Belfield: City of Belfield
in 1915 granted a franchise which was later assigned to Plaintiff company, to construct a light plant in the city and sell light and power for
25 years, with option to allow village to purchase at end of 15 years.
The rates to be charged were made part of the franchise. In 1920,
Plaintiff filed application with North Dakota Board of Railway Commissioners for permission to increase its rates. This was done and
city pa*id these increased rates up to January, 1927, whereupon it refused to pay them. This action was brought by Plaintiff Power Co.
to compel payment of rates. Defendant city entered a counter-claim
for money paid in excess of franchise. From a judgment disallowing
Plaintiff's claim and also Defendant's counterclaim, both parties
appeal. HELD: Affirmed. A city council has authority to grant franchise
to electric light company and'may impose as a condition that such company shall furnish service at a stipulated price. Board of Railway
Commissioners has only those powers conferred on it by the legislature
in the Public Utilities Act, which Act does not give the Board power
to interfere with rates which have been fixed by contract in the franchise. In this case, order of Board of Railway Commissioners was
illegal and void, but payments made by city to electric light company
were done without misrepresentation or fraud and therefore the city
is not entitled to recover money so paid.-A. E. A.
Voter vs. Newsalt: Plaintiff had a hernia of long standing. One
King, of Omaha, not licensed to practice in N. D., claimed to be able
to cure without operation, and referred plaintiff to Defendant, stating,
"I have treated 20 cases for him". Plaintiff went to the office of defendant, as arranged by correspondence with him and King. When
he arrived at the office, defendant said, "Here is our man". Defendant
and King attempted a cure by inserting a needle through the wall of

